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Alana Klein* Criminal Law and the Counter-Hegemonic
Potential of Harm Reduction
Harm reduction approaches to drug use have been lauded for saving lives, being
cost-effective, elevating pragmatism over prohibitionist ideology, being flexible
in tailoring responses to the problem, and for their counter-hegemonic potential
to empower people who use drugs. This article examines the legal systems
engagement with harm reduction, and, in particular, recent cases that incorporate
harm reduction s focus on empirical evidence in policy making into Canadian
constitutional rights jurisprudence. It argues that harm reduction approaches in
this venue may hold promise as a bulwark against some of the marginalizing
features of traditional criminal justice approaches. However, the article also warns
of a risk of inadvertently reinforcing the dominant discourse of criminalization and
stigmatization as harm reduction s features are embodied within the institutional
frameworks of the state.
Les approches visant a reduire les effets nocifs de Iutilisation de stupefiants
ont ete vantees comme sauvant des vies, comme etant des solutions de
rechange economiques qui placent le pragmatisme au-dessus de lideologie
prohibitionniste, comme adoptant une attitude souple et offrant des reponses
adaptees au probleme des stupefiants. Elles ont aussi ete vantees pour leur
potentiel antihegemonique a donner des moyens aux utilisateurs de stupefiants.
L'article examine I'engagement du systeme juridique par rapport a la reduction
des effets nocifs, en particulier les cas recents qui integrent I'accent mis par
cette approche sur les preuves empiriques dans I'elaboration de politiques a la
jurisprudence constitutionnelle canadienne en matiere de droits. Lauteure avance
que les approches de reduction des effets nocifs dans ce forum constituent peut-
6tre un rempart contre certains des risques de marginalisation que presentent les
approches de la justice penale traditionnelle. Elle met cependant en garde contre
le risque de renforcer par inadvertance, le discours dominant qui affirme que la
criminalisation et la stigmatisation comme caracteristiques de la reduction des
effets nocifs sont inherentes aux cadres institutionnels de I'Etat.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
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Introduction
Canada's increasingly punitive criminal justice policy has attracted
criticism for its human costs in terms of health and well-being, for acting
as a politically marginalizing force, and for its ineffectiveness at reducing
crime.1 It has also met with judicial resistance. 2 In the area of drug use,
both in Canada and internationally, harm reduction has emerged as the
main alternative to the prevailing approaches of criminal law enforcement
and abstinence-oriented medical treatment.3 This paper considers whether
recent judicial engagement with the concepts of harm reduction might
offer a partial response to the marginalizing consequences of expansive
criminal justice in Canada.
1. See, e.g., Paula Mallea, The Fear Factor: Stephen Harper's "'Tough on Crime "Agenda (Ottawa:
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010); Justin Piche, "Le regime de sanctions de Harper"
(2013) 9 Nouveaux Cahiers du Socialisme 119; Alana N Cook & Ronald Roesch, "'Tough on Crime'
Reforms: What Psychology Has to Say About the Recent and Proposed Justice Policy in Canada"
(2013) 53:3 Canadian Psychology 217.
2. R v Hill, 2012 ONSC 5050, 291 CCC (3d) 321; R v Lewis, 2012 ONCJ 413, 264 CRR (2d)
122; R v Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, 304 CCC (3d) 37; R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15; Canada (AG) v
Whaling, 2014 SCC 20, [2014] 1 SCR 392; R v MacDonald, 2014 NSCA 102, 117 WCB (2d)
235; R v Cloud, 2014 QCCQ 464, 300 CRR (2d) 349; R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627,
122 OR (3d) 97; R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 SCR 575; R v Michael, 2014 ONCJ 360,
121 OR (3d) 244. See also Debra Parkes, "The Punishment Agenda in the Courts" (2014) 67 SCLR
(2d) 589 at 590, 614; Kent Roach, "The Charter versus the Government's Crime Agenda" (2012)
58 SCLR (2d) 211; Don Stuart, "The Charter Balance against Unscrupulous Law and Order Politics"
(2012) 57 SCLR (2d) 13 at 13-18.
3. Patricia G Erickson et al, eds, Harm Reduction: A New Direction for Drug Policies and
Programs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 4-6 [Erickson et al, New Direction]; G
Alan Marlatt, Harm Reduction: Pragmatic Strategiesfor Managing High Risk Behaviors (New York:
Guilford Press, 1998) at 50-51 [Marlatt, Pragmatic Strategies].
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Although the definition of the term "harm reduction" is contested, 4 it
is generally used to refer to policies, programs, interventions or practices
designed to minimize negative health and social consequences associated
with drug use without requiring the cessation of drug use itself.' Needle
exchange, safe injection sites, and prescription of opiates to addicts are
among the best-known examples.6 As a response to the use of illicit drugs,
harm reduction has been lauded for saving lives,7 for its cost-effectiveness,
for elevating pragmatism over prohibitionist ideology, for its flexibility in
fitting the response to the problem,9 and also, particularly in contrast with
traditional criminal law approaches, for its counter-hegemonic potential to
empower people who use drugs.1"
Although it has at times formed an important part of federal and
provincial criminal and health policy in Canada," the law's relationship
with harm reduction has been ambivalent. While harm reduction
4. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
5. Douglas J Beirness et al, Harm Reduction: What s in a Name? (Ottawa: Canadian Centre on
Substance Abuse, 2008) at 3; Patricia G Erickson, "Harm Reduction: What It Is and Is Not" (1995) 14:3
Drug & Alcohol Rev 283 at 284 [Erickson, "What It Is and Is Not"]; Harm Reduction International,
"What is Harm Reduction," online: <www.ihra.netl/what-is-harm-reduction>.
6. Dan Small, Anita Palepu & Mark W Tyndall, "The Establishment of North America's First State
Sanctioned Supervised Injection Facility: A Case Study in Culture Change" (2006) 17:2 Intl J Drug
Policy 73 at 74-76; Thomas Kerr, Megan Oleson & Evan Wood, "Harm-Reduction Activism: A Case
Study of an Unsanctioned User-Run Safe Injection Site" (2004) 9:2 Can HIV/AIDS Pol'y & L Rev
at 13; Samuel R Friedman et al, "Harm Reduction Theory: Users' Culture, Micro-Social Indigenous
Harm Reduction, and the Self-Organization and Outside-Organizing of Users' Groups" (2007) 18:2
Intl J Drug Policy 107 at 115-116; Tom Carnwath, "Prescribing Heroin" (2005) 14 Am J on Addiction
311 at 315-316.
7. See, e.g., Don C des Jarlais et al, "HIV Incidence among Injecting Drug Users inNew York City
Syringe Exchange Programmes" (1996) 348:9033 The Lancet 987.
8. See, e.g., Peter Anderson, Dan Chisholm & Daniela C Fuhr, "Effectiveness and Cost-
Effectiveness of Policies and Programmes to Reduce the Harm Caused by Alcohol" (2009) 373:9682
The Lancet 2234; Philip Jacobs et al, "Cost Effectiveness of Streetworks' Needle Exchange Program
of Edmonton" (1999) 90:3 Can J Public Health 168 at 168.
9. Erickson, "What It Is and Is Not," supra note 5 at 284.
10. See, e.g., Aileen O'Goreman et al, "Peer, Professional, and Public: An Analysis of the Drugs
Policy Advocacy Community in Europe" (2014) 25:5 Intl J Drug Policy 1001 at 1004; Friedman et al,
supra note 6 at 108-110; Neil Wieloch, "Collective Mobilization and Identity from the Underground:
The Deployment of Oppositional Capital in the Harm Reduction Movement" (2002) 43:1 Sociological
Q 45 at 48-50; PM Spittal et al, "How Otherwise Dedicated AIDS Prevention Workers Come to
Support State-Sponsored Shortage of Clean Syringes in Vancouver, Canada" (2003) 15:1 Intl J Drug
Policy 36 at 37.
11. For a review of the role of harm reduction in Canadian drug policy, see Walter Cavalieri & Diane
Riley, "Harm Reduction in Canada: The Many Faces of Regression" in Richard Pates & Diane Riley,
eds, Harm Reduction in Substance Use and High-Risk Behaviour: International Policy and Practice
(London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 382.
450 The Dalhousie Law Journal
increasingly finds support in international human rights law,12 domestic
criminal law enforcement has tended to interfere with harm reduction
efforts. 3 Domestic courts, for their part, have engaged with harm reduction
relatively little.14
Recently, however, judges, policymakers, and scholars have begun
to explicitly and implicitly reflect and support aspects of harm reduction
in legal approaches to socially contested or contestable behaviours, both
within and beyond the drug use context. In particular, some judicial
decisions, 5 legislative projects, 16 and pieces of legal scholarship 17 have
approached issues such as sex work, illegal migration, and assisted death
with a shift in focus away from moral judgment and a rejection of punitive
approaches in favour of pragmatic, public health-oriented interventions
geared toward mitigating measurable harms and empowering marginalized
actors to attend to their own well-being.
This paper focuses on the growing emphasis in Canadian constitutional
rights jurisprudence on evidence-based policy, on the health and well-
being of the legal subject, and implicitly on the subject's participation in
shaping the norms that affect it. It argues that this emphasis is oriented
toward harm reduction, and may hold promise as a bulwark against some
of the marginalizing features of traditional criminal justice approaches
that punish based on contestable majoritarian views at the expense of
the health and well-being of marginalized groups. Lessons from critical
public health literature on harm reduction, however, suggest a risk of
12. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, 65th Sess, UN
Doc A/65/255 (2010) at 16-24; Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, UNGAOR, 60th Sess, Annex,
Agenda Item 45, UN Doc A/RES/60/262 (2006) at 4; World Health Organization, "Injecting Drug
Use," online: <www.who.int/hiv/topics/idu/en/>; High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press
Release, "High Commissioner Calls for Focus on Human Rights and Harm Reduction in International
Drug Policy," (10 March 2009), online: UN Human Rights-Office of the HCHR Media Center
<www.ohchr org/documents/Press/HC -human-rights and harm reduction-drugpolicypdf>.
13. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 69, 92.
16. Bill 52, An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, 1 st sess, 41th Leg, Quebec, 2014 (assented to June
10, 2014, SQ 2014, c 2) [Bill 52].
17. See, e.g., Erickson et al, New Direction, supra note 3; Joanne Csete & Jonathan Cohen, "Human
Rights in Vancouver: Do Injection Drug Users Have a Friend in City Hall?" (2003) 8:2 Can HIV/AIDS
Policy & L Rev 1; Margaretha Jlrvinen, "Approaches to Methadone Treatment: Harm Reduction
in Theory and Practice" (2008) 30:7 Sociology Health & Illness 975; Desmond Manderson, "From
Zero Tolerance to Harm Reduction: 'The Asylum Problem Problem'" (2013) 32:4 Refugee Survey Q
1; Mark Parts, "Disease Prevention as Drug Policy: A Historical Perspective on the Case for Legal
Access to Sterile Syringes as a Means of Reducing Drug-Related Harm" (1996) 24 Fordham Urban
LJ 475; Linda Cusick, "Widening the Harm Reduction Agenda: From Drug Use to Sex Work" (2006)
17:1 Intl J Drug Policy 3.
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inadvertent reinforcement of the dominant discourse of criminalization
and stigmatization as harm reduction's features are embodied within
state institutional frameworks. For example, the commitment to non-
judgmentalism and to value neutrality vis-di-vis drug use itself, which
has been a key feature of harm reduction, is compromised in various
ways as it moves from grassroots movement to state-based public health
intervention. Similarly, though all versions of harm reduction emphasize
their effectiveness at protecting the health and well-being of subjects,
the evidentiary methods by which, and the standard against which,
interventions are assessed in public health iterations of harm reduction
become more stringent and less open to the participation of people who use
drugs. These difficulties are likely to be reproduced and exacerbated in the
judicial iteration. Consequently, as harm reduction moves from grassroots
movement to public health intervention and finally to a legal device, the
subject is constructed less as a worthy citizen whose knowledge deserves
equal respect, but rather as deviant or helpless.
Part I sets out the history and key features of harm reduction,
describing its roots in both public health and community activism.
Part II argues that Canadian constitutional limits on the scope of the criminal
law are beginning to reflect key features of harm reduction and that this
development may help mitigate some alleged excesses of criminal justice.
Part III interrogates the elements of harm reduction as they appear in each
context, showing how the identity of the subject is understood differently
in each. It describes how harm reduction was drained of its potential to
reconstruct the agency of the drug user in its shift from grassroots to state-
based public health intervention, and warns that adopting the language and
concepts of harm reduction within constitutional discourse likewise risks
reinforcing rather than undermining hegemonies perpetuated through law.
I. Origins and definition of harm reduction
Harm reduction is known today primarily as a social policy response
to the spread of HIV/AIDS among injection drug users. The term itself
began to gain currency after the First International Conference on the
Reduction of Drug-Related Harm in Liverpool in 1990,18 which brought
together drug users, public health officials, front-line workers, health
professionals, and police officers around a project aiming at reducing
risky behaviours associated with drug use rather than at reducing drug
18. See Erickson et al, New Direction, supra note 3 at 3.
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use itself 19 This conference formed the basis of the contemporary
international harm reduction movement, which has resulted in a number
of international advocacy networks and international nongovernmental
organizations supporting harm reduction.2" The practice and philosophy of
harm reduction, however, find their roots in both public health policy and
grassroots community activism.
1. Public health
Harm reduction, with its focus on "what works," in many ways reflects
traditional public health principles rooted in nineteenth-century utilitarian
thought. Public health is characterized by its emphasis on the health and
well-being of the general population as well as (and often over) that of the
individual. As such, it focuses on community-level interventions through
broad laws and policies aimed at the prevention of disease rather than
individual curative medical treatment.21 It is frequently observed that harm
reduction is not really new in this regard. Among health professionals,
the idea of accepting the reality of drug use while minimizing harmful
social and individual consequences dates at least as far back as 1920s
Britain, when an expert committee of physicians chaired by Sir Humphry
Rolleston, then President of the Royal College of Physicians, supported
prescribing heroin to addicts in order that they may live "a fairly normal
and useful life."22 The concept is likewise reflected in the 1970s and 1980s
public health policies on alcohol and tobacco, which urged minimization
and moderation at the individual level in recognition that abstinence was
not always realistic.23
In relation to illicit drugs, however, any public health-based calls to
include minimization of harm as a drug policy goal failed to gain purchase
in the context of the "war on drugs" that escalated in the United States
19. See Pat O'Hare, "Merseyside, the First Harm Reduction Conferences, and the Early History of
Harm Reduction" (2007) 18:2 Intl J Drug Policy 141; Neil Hunt et al, A Review of the Evidence Base
for Harm Reduction Approaches to Drug Use (London: Forward Thinking on Drugs, 2003).
20. See Patricia G Erickson, "Introduction: The Three Phases of Harm Reduction. An Examination
of Emerging Concepts, Methodologies, and Critiques" (1999) 34:1 Substance Use & Misuse 1 at
2 [Erickson, "Three Phases"]; Tuukka Tammi, "The Harm-Reduction School of Thought: Three
Fractions" (2004) 31:3 Contemporary Drug Problems 381 at 383.
21. See Lawrence 0 Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2nd ed (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008) at 6-8. See also AJ McMichael & R Beaglehole, "The Changing
Global Context of Public Health" (2000) 356:9228 The Lancet 495 at 495.
22. Report of the Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, HMSO, 1926,
excerpts reproduced in Mike Ashton, "The Rolleston Legacy" (2006) 15 Drug & Alcohol Findings 4
at 7. See also Virginia Berridge, "Harm Minimisation and Public Health: An Historical Perspective" in
Nick Heather et al, eds, Psychoactive Drugs and Harm Reduction: From Faith to Science 55 (London:
Whurr, 1993), which outlines the history of minimization of drug-related harm.
23. Erickson, "What It Is and Is Not," supra note 5 at 284.
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and spread globally through the 1970s and the early 1980s. At that time,
drug use came to be understood less as a social behaviour with potential
individual and societal-level harmful consequences, and more as a
"socially infectious disease" in and of itself.24 It was only following the
AIDS crisis that the prevention of harms incidental to drug use and the
prioritization of immediate health concerns over longer-term abstention
goals became politically palatable.25
The public health embrace of harm reduction for illicit drugs also
coincides with the growing influence of the "new public health,"26 a
philosophy that has played an important role in shaping harm reduction's
key features. The new public health maintains public health's collectivist
philosophy and focus on environmental factors that drive disease, but
criticizes the traditional emphasis on biomedical models of harms. Instead,
it views disease as a profoundly social phenomenon, embracing cultural
and psychological factors that shape health and health interventions'
outcomes. It also reconceives the actor as an agent engaging with those
physical, psychological, cultural and environmental forces, rather than as
24. Virginia Berridge, "Histories of Harm Reduction: Illicit Drugs, Tobacco, and Nicotine" (1999)
34:1 Substance Use & Misuse 35 at 36 [Berridge, "Histories"]; G Alan Marlatt, "Harm Reduction:
Come as You Are" (1996) 21:6 Addictive Behaviours 779 at 783-784 [Marlatt, "Come as You Are"];
Cavalieri & Riley, supra note 11; Erickson, "Three Phases," supra note 20 at 2; Benedikt Fischer,
"The Battle for a New Canadian Drug Law: A Legal Basis for Harm Reduction or a New Rhetoric
for Prohibition? A Chronology" in Erickson et al, supra note 3, 47 at 47-49 [Fischer, "The Battle"]
(outlining the development of Canada's prohibitionist approach to drug use). However, see Friedman
et al, supra note 6 at 110, who note that one exception to this trend is Dutch drug policy, which as early
as the 1970s had integrated some aspects of harm reductionby prioritizing the well-being of drug users
over goals of eradicating drug use.
25. See Berridge, "Histories," supra note 24 at 36; Fischer, "The Battle," supra note 24 at 49. See
also John R Ashton & Howard Seymour, "Public Health and the Origins of the Mersey Model of
Harm Reduction" (2010) 21:2 Intl J Drug Policy 94 at 95 [Ashton & Seymour, "Origins of the Mersey
Model"], which quotes the 1988 Report of the UK Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs as
follows: "[t]he spread of HIV is a greater danger to individual and public health than drug misuse.
Accordingly, services which aim to minimize HIV behaviour by all available means should take
precedence in development plans." Contra W Anderson, "The New York Needle Trial: The Politics of
Public Health in the Age of AIDS" in Virginia Berridge & Philip Strong, eds, AIDS and Contemporary
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), describing how the public health effort to
bring harm reduction to New York failed due to lack of political support.
26. See Erickson, "Three Phases," supra note 20 at 2; Tim Rhodes, "The 'Risk Environment': A
Framework for Understanding and Reducing Drug-Related Harm" (2002) 13:2 Intl J Drug Policy 85
at 86: "[h]arm reduction in the time of AIDS is arguably one of the best documented examples of a
new public health movement." See also O'Hare, supra note 19 at 141, explaining how Mersey state
public health actors became the first to embrace harm reduction by bringing together traditional public
health ideas around environmental change, prevention, and therapeutic interventions with a focus on
"social aspects of health problems which are caused by lifestyles," citing John R Ashton & Howard
Seymour, The New Public Health: The Liverpool Experience (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University
Press, 1988) at 21 [Ashton & Seymour, New Public Health].
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a passive recipient of services.27 Finally, it seeks to avoid a victim-blaming
mentality, which is said to be typical of traditional public health services
in that they tend to view those who fail to take up reasonable suggestions
as intransigent or difficult patients. 28 Instead, the new public health tries
to shift health interventions toward "user-friendly and non-judgmental
services". 29 This combination of features has made for mutual hospitability
between the new public health and harm reduction approaches as both
developed.3" The conceptual and practical elements of harm reduction,
particularly as they appear within state public health institutions, draw on
and are guided by the principles of the new public health.3 1
2. Community activism
Harm reduction likewise has roots in community activism. 3 2 Riley and
colleagues observe that harm reduction, in the form of social rituals and
codes that enable peers to help one another use psychoactive substances
safely, has likely existed for thousands of years.33 In contemporary society,
public health actors took up harm reduction in the era of HIV/AIDS in part
after observing the success of grassroots, peer-to-peer organization among
drug users themselves.34
In 198 1, for example, a group of drug users from Rotterdam formed the
first such recognized group, the "Junkiebond," which has been described as
a "kind of trade union for concerned hard-drug users."35 The Junkiebond's
philosophy was based on the idea that drug users are the best placed to
know what their problems are, and its mandate was to "improve the housing
and general situation of the addict."36 This included both political action-
27. Ibid Jonathan Mann, "Human Rights and the New Public Health" (1995) 1:3 Health & Human
Rights 229.
28. Tuukka Tammi & Toivo Hurme, "How the Harm Reduction Movement Contrasts Itself Against
Punitive Prohibition" (2007) 18:2 Intl J Drug Policy 84 at 87.
29. Ashton & Seymour, "Origins of the Mersey Model," supra note 25 at 95; see also Ashton &
Seymour, New Public Health, supra note 26 at 21.
30. Rhodes, supra note 26.
31. Ashton & Seymour, "Origins of the Mersey Model," supra note 25 at 95, describing how the
authors, early proponents of the new public health, developed their model in part through engagement
with harm reduction and HIV
32. See Friedman et al, supra note 6; Christopher BR Smith, "Harm Reduction as Anarchist Practice:
A User's Guide to Capitalism and Addiction in North America" (2012) 22:2 Critical Public Health
209; Gordon Roe, "Harm Reduction as Paradigm: Is Better than Bad Good Enough? The Origins of
Harm Reduction" (2005) 15:3 Critical Public Health 243.
33. See Diane Riley et al, "A Brief History of Harm Reduction" in Pates & Riley, supra note 11, 5
at 5.
34. See Marlatt, "Come as You Are," supra note 24; Ashton & Seymour, "Origins of the Mersey
Model," supra note 25; Roe, supra note 32.
35. See Marlatt, "Come as You Are," supra note 24.
36. GF van de Wijngaart, Competing Perspectives on Drug Use: The Dutch Experience (Amsterdam:
Swets & Zeitlinger, 1991) cited in Marlatt, "Come as You Are," ibid at 784.
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consulting with government officials, including police and lawmakers, on
matters like housing policy and methadone treatment availability-as well
as providing peer-based health information and services. The Junkiebond
ultimately led to the development of Amsterdam's first needle exchange
program, as well as to a policy of "normalization" of the drug problem
in Holland. This meant "produc[ing] a context where the addict more
resembles an unemployed Dutch citizen than a monster endangering
society."3 The Junkiebond's success in influencing state policy is credited
in part to the fact that, even before the HIV epidemic, Dutch drug policy
was already oriented toward harm reduction-for example, by favouring
methadone maintenance over abstinence-oiented treatments .38
The Dutch model, in turn, inspired actors in places like Merseyside,
U.K., to pioneer their own state-facilitated public health harm reduction
efforts.39 So did the experience in San Francisco, where the massive
impact of HIV on the gay community led health authorities to emphasize
how the most effective actions to address diseases usually included the
direct involvement of people at risk.41 In other places, such as New York,
harm reduction operated for some time solely as a grassroots effort, since
public health authorities were slow to endorse harm reduction in response
to the epidemic, due to the massive demonization of drug users. 41 By 1990,
activists from the non-governmental organization ACT UP and state public
health researchers acting "on their 'free time"' had created underground
needle exchanges in New York City, which have been credited with
facilitating later state action to fund them and make them legal. 42
In Canada, politicized street-based outreach workers from Toronto
started the first harm reduction programs-including bleach programs
for cleaning syringes and syringe exchanges-in 1987-1988. These
were adopted by the city's public health authorities in 1989. 43 Later,
harm reduction programs, including methadone maintenance and syringe
programs, proliferated in many urban and even some rural communities
across the country.44 Though these were put in place primarily under
37. EM Engelsman, "Dutch Policy on the Management of Drug-Related Problems" (1989) 84
British J Addiction 211.
38. Ibid; Friedman et al, supra note 6 at 110.
39. See O'Hare, supra note 19 at 142.
40. See Ashton & Seymour, "Origins of the Mersey Model," supra note 25 at 94-95.
41. See Friedman et al, supra note 6 at 108.
42. Ibid at 110.
43. See Cavalieri & Riley, supra note I I at 383.
44. Ibid
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municipal and provincialj urisdictions over health, 5 they were also practiced
clandestinely by peer user groups in various stages of organization. Support
at the federal level varied. Canada's 1987 Drug Strategy was framed
in terms of reducing drug-related harm, and the Canadian Centre for
Substance Abuse, founded under this strategy, promoted harm reduction
and researched alternatives to prohibition.46 From 1998 to 2007, Canada's
federal drug strategy included harm reduction as one of its four "pillars, 47
but this inclusion was criticized as hollow, since harm reduction efforts
were defunded over that period and funds were increasingly directed into
law enforcement.48 After coming into power in 2006, the Conservative
government excised any mention of harm reduction, and needle exchange
in particular, from its National Anti-Drug Strategy.
The Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU), established in
1998, was formed in the context of this federal-level regression from harm
reduction.4 9 Modeled after the Dutch Junkiebond, this first Canadian drug
users union was established in response to rising rates of HIV, hepatitis C
and overdose deaths among people using drugs in Vancouver's Downtown
Eastside and to government inaction. VANDU is run entirely by current
or former users,51 and its activities include advocating for human rights of
drug users, opposing punitive drug policies, and providing support, harm
reduction supplies and peer education. 2 It also operated an unsanctioned
safe injection site,53 and has played a key role with municipal and
provincial authorities to establish Insite, Canada's first legally recognized
safe injection site. 4
45. See Alana Klein, Sticking Points: Barriers to Access to Needle and Syringe Programs in Canada
(Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2007) at 5.
46. See Cavalieri & Riley, supra note 11 at 383.
47. See Library of Parliament, "Substance Abuse Issues and Public Policy in Canada: I. Canada's
Federal Drug Strategy," by Chantal Collin, No PRB-06-15E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 13 April
2006) at 2, online: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prbO6l5-e.pdf>.
48. See Cavalieri & Riley, supra note 11 at 383; E Oscapella & DM Riley, "Canada's New Drug
Law: Some Implications for HIV/AIDS Prevention in Canada" (1987) 7:3 Intl J on Drug Policy 180.
49. See Cavalieri & Riley, supra note 11 at 383.
50. See Jade Boyd & Susan Boyd, "Women's Activism in a Drug User Union in the Downtown
Eastside" (2014) 17:3 Contemporary Justice Rev 313.
51. See Thomas Kerr et al, Responding to an Emergency: Education, Advocacy and Community
Care by a Peer-Driven Organization of Drug Users: A Case Study of VancouverArea Network of Drug
Users (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2001) at 17.
52. Ibid at 6.
53. See Kerr, Oleson & Wood, supra note 6.
54. See Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users, "VANDU History: Civil Disobedience Necessary
in Fight for Safer Injection Site" (6 November 2010), online: VANDU <www.vandu.org/vandu-
history -civil-disobedience-necessary-in-fight-for-safer-inj ection-site/>.
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3. Common key features
Despite many attempts to define "harm reduction," there is no agreed-
upon definition of "harm reduction."55 This is unsurprising, given the
multiple roles that harm reduction plays: as a grassroots identity-based
social movement for people who use drugs,56 as a method for street-based
outreach,57 as an international human rights movement," and as a state
institutional response to drug use. The most encompassing definitions, (e.g.
"interventions that address adverse consequences of drug use") obscure
important epistemic differences. Most scholars and actors reject definition
of harm reduction as a goal, since all approaches to drug use, even the
most oppressive criminalization models, share the goal of reducing harms
associated with drug use. " Instead, harm reduction is generally conceived
as a method for reducing harm. Beyond this, differences persist. For
some, harm reduction is a "set of policies and programs," while others
contest such a formulation on the basis that drug users themselves are
the primary practitioners of harm reduction, and that state policies and
programs merely play a supporting role.6" Some say that harm reduction
"does not preclude abstinence as a worthy goal,"61 whereas others say that
it "recognizes abstinence as an ideal outcome but accepts alternatives that
reduce harm."62
Because harm reduction may fairly mean different things to different
people, it is more appropriate to frame the approach in terms of commonly
shared themes or features.63 These include (1) value neutrality as to the
underlying behaviour (e.g., drug use, sex work), (2) elevating pragmatism
and scientism over dogmatism and belief, (3) dismissal of punitive and
authoritarian approaches, and (4) construction of the subject as a worthy
citizen with full responsibilities and participation rights.6 4 Part II will argue
that recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have integrated
55. See e.g. Diane Riley et al, "Harm Reduction: Concepts and Practice. A Policy Discussion
Paper"(1999) 34:1 Substance Use & Misuse 9 at 11-12 [Riley et al, "Concepts and Practice"]; Hunt,
supra note 19 at 2, surveying a number of proposed definitions. See also Friedman et al, supra note 6
at 107; Simon Lenton & Eric Single, "The Definition of Harm Reduction" (1998) 17 Drug & Alcohol
Rev 213.
56. See Tammi & Hurme supra note 28 at 87; Roe, supra note 32.
57. See Marlatt, Pragmatic Strategies, supra note 3 at 54.
58. See Richard Elliott et al, "Harm Reduction, HJV/AIDS, and the Human Rights Challenge to
Global Drug Control Policy" (2005) 8:2 Health & Human Rights 104 at 104.
59. See Alex Wodak & Bill Saunders, "Harm Reduction Means What I Choose It to Meaf' (1995)
14:3 Drug & Alcohol Rev 269 at 269.
60. See Friedman et al, supra note 6 at 107.
61. See Elliott et al, supra note 58 at 110.
62. See Marlatt, "Come as You Are," supra note 24 at 50.
63. See Tammi, supra note 20 at 384; Erickson et al, New Directions, supra note 3 at 7-10.
64. See Kerr et al, supra note 51.
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and promoted these features in constitutional jurisprudence setting limits
on the substantive reach of criminal law. Part III will interrogate these
features as they appear within each institutional context and draw some
conclusions about how it constructs the identity of the legal subject.
II. Legal engagement with harm reduction
Until recently, the law engaged with harm reduction relatively little in
determinations about the reach of criminal sanctions. In many cases, the
criminal law has undermined harm reduction efforts, for example through
police enforcement of criminal law65 and through sentencing decisions
that required offenders to stay clear of areas where harm reduction services
are offered.66 Occasionally, courts have viewed harm reduction favourably
as a way of managing future risky behaviour. For example, in one child
protection case, participation in a harm reduction program was treated
as a potential factor in favour of fitness for a mother who used drugs.67
Similarly, sentencing judges have occasionally treated participation in
harm reduction programs as mitigating the risk of reoffending and serving
rehabilitative purposes.6"
The Supreme Court of Canada mentioned harm reduction for the first
time in the 2011 decision in Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services.69
This decision engaged with harm reduction on a number of levels. Most
obviously, it had the effect of supporting a particular harm reduction
initiative. It also reflected some of harm reduction's premises in its
reasoning. Finally, it incorporated, in a limited way, some elements of
harm reduction's reasoning into legal doctrine.
The case concerned the survival of Insite, a safe injection site in
Vancouver's Downtown Eastside that had been operating since 2003
under a medical/scientific exemption from the criminal prohibition on
drug possession granted under section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and
65. See Csete & Cohen, supra note 16 at 7-8; Kerr, Oleson & Wood, supra note 6 at 15-17; Klein,
supra note 45 at 16-19; Will Small et al, "Impacts of Intensified Police Activity on Injection Drug
Users: Evidence from anEthnographic Investigation" (2006) 17:2 Intl JDrug Policy 85; Evan Wood et
al, "Displacement of Canada's Largest Public Illicit Drug Market in Response to a Police Crackdown"
(2004) 170:10 Can Medical Association J 1551.
66. Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Dominique Benier & Celine Bellot, "Zone Restrictions Orders in
Canadian Courts and the Reproduction of Socio-Economic Inequality" (2015) 5:1 Ofati Socio-Legal
Series 280.
67. See e.g. Children 's Aid Society of Halifax v S (), [1996] WDFL 724 at para 44, 60 ACWS (3d)
316.
68. R v Lukas, 2012 ABPC 134 at para 10, 26, [2012] AJ No 706 (QL). See also R v Lee, 2003
BCSC 2066 at para 14, [2003] BCJ No 3284 (QL), which accepted that the objective of harm reduction
was relevant in the sentencing of an addicted offender.
69. 2011SCC 44 atpara 131, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [PHS].
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Substances Act."0 In 2008, Insite's operators applied for a new exemption
to replace one that was set to expire. The federal Minister of Health,
consistent with the federal drug policy that was hostile to harm reduction,"
denied the application. According to the Court, the Minister's initial
failure to grant the exemption violated Insite's clients' rights to life, liberty
and security in a manner incompatible with the principles of fundamental
justice,2 notably the principles that state decisions engaging with section 7
rights must not be arbitrary or have effects grossly disproportionate to their
purposes. 73 The Court ruled that denying the exemption in the context of
Vancouver's Downtown Eastside had the perverse effect of undermining,
rather than promoting, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act's goal
of protecting public health and safety. Relevant contextual factors in the
determination that the law was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate
included: (1) that criminal law prohibitions were not working to reduce
drug use in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver where Insite operated;
(2) Insite's demonstrated success at reducing death and disease; and (3)
Insite's demonstrated failure to contribute to increasing crime rates, rates
of public injection or relapse rates in the area.7 4 As such, the Minister's
decision was both arbitrary, in that it failed to serve its intended purposes,
and grossly disproportionate, in that it compromised the lives and safety
of Insite's clients without any corresponding benefit.
7 5
The Court explicitly stated that it was not pronouncing on whether
abstinence-based approaches were generally better than harm reduction,7 6
and its decision did not touch the continuing constitutional validity of
drug possession laws more broadly.77 It did, however, have the effect of
insulating the particular harm reduction initiative at issue from interference
with criminal drug possession laws on the basis that the harm reduction
intervention had proven more effective than criminal enforcement alone
at protecting the health and well-being of the community in Vancouver's
Downtown Eastside .78
70. SC 1996, c 19, s 56.
71. See PHS, supra note 69 at paras 114, 122.
72. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
73. See Peter W Hogg, "The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter" (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 195
at 209.
74. PHS, supra note 69 at paras 129, 131-132.
75. Ibid at paras 132-133.
76. PHS, supra note 69 at para 105.
77. Ibidatpara 114.
78. Ibid.
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Beyond its practical effect, the decision also reflected a number of
harm reduction's starting premises at various points in the reasoning,
albeit in a limited way and often in deference to findings of fact from
the trial judge. In determining that the rights to life and security of the
person were engaged, the Supreme Court accepted that many health risks
of injection drug use do not come from the drug itself but from unsanitary
practices and conditions. 9 Further, it rejected the federal government's
argument that drug addicts choose to assume those risks and that "those
who commit crimes should be made to suffer the consequences.""0 Instead,
it acknowledged that state conduct-in this case, preventing access to an
existing health intervention via a criminal prohibition-could act as a
systemic factor making drug use more dangerous, particularly given that
loss of control overthe need to consume is characteristic of drug addiction."1
It also recognized the safe injection site, created under provincial health
jurisdiction and through the cooperation of federal, provincial, municipal
and community efforts, as a health care service addressing the vulnerability
and the negative consequences of drug use. 2 Finally, it acknowledged that
at least in the Downtown Eastside, prohibitionist policies were failing to
achieve their desired goals. 3
Perhaps less obviously, the Court also developed section 7 of the
Charter in a manner that favours harm reduction's methodological
commitment to empirical effects on health over moral or ideological
considerations. First, it de-emphasized moral disapprobation as a
legitimate basis for criminalization in favour of empirical examination
of both the damage that the criminal law can do and its effectiveness in
serving its purposes. Of course, PHS does not represent the first time that
the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized empirical demonstrations
of harm in setting out the limits of the criminal law. In its interpretation
of what constitutes obscenity in Canadian criminal law, for example, the
Court has moved from a community standards test to a harm-based test.
4
It remains, however, that prior to PHS, the doctrines of arbitrariness and
79. Ibid at para 93.
80. Ibid at para 102.
81. Ibid at paras 97-106.
82. Ibid at para 93.
83. Ibidatpara 131.
84. R v Labaye, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 SCR 728, strengthening the suggestion inR v Butler, [1992]
1 SCR 452, 89 DLR (4th) 449, that obscenity requires more thanjust apprehension of moral harm.
Criminal Law and the Counter-Hegemonic Potential 461
of Harm Reduction
gross disproportionality did relatively little to limit the substantive scope
of the criminal law.85
The Supreme Court of Canada's 2003 decision in R v Malmo-Levine
provides a useful counterpoint. In that decision, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the criminal prohibition of marijuana possession
challenged under section 7 of the Charter as non-arbitrary, on the basis
that it expressed society's collective disapproval of marijuana use and
responded to a reasonable apprehension of harm to society. 6 The same
law was not found to be grossly disproportionate because adverse effects
including stigma were viewed as "inherent" costs that inevitably result
whenever Parliament exercises its criminal law power and someone
chooses to break the law.17 The Court tersely rejected an argument that
the marijuana prohibition was disproportionate because it was ineffective
at preventing marijuana use, expressing a skepticism that its role was to
closely examine the effectiveness of any legislative measure.88 Finally, the
Court declined to balance the law's salutary and deleterious effects as part
of its gross disproportionality analysis on the basis that this was a function
for section 1 justification of Charter violations, rather than for section 7
violations themselves.89
In PHS, by contrast, rather than deferring to the Minister on the basis
that a uniform stance on the possession of narcotics might reasonably be
expected to deter their use in its arbitrariness analysis, the Court mandated
and engaged in close scrutiny of the impact of both criminal prohibitions
and Insite's impacts on health and safety in Vancouver's Downtown
Eastside.9" Similarly, in its analysis on gross disproportionality, the
Court explicitly balanced salutary and deleterious effects of Insite and
uniform drug prohibition in the Downtown Eastside.91 Thus, while PHS
did not overrule Malmo-Levine's holding that Parliament may legislate
criminality based on society's collective disapproval, the closer scrutiny of
whether the law is achieving its ends and of collateral negative effects of
the drug law in PHS has the effect of limiting the extent to which the state
85. This leaves aside constitutional constraints in s 7 of the Charter related to, for example,
procedural rights in the context of criminal justice (e.g. R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326, [1992] 1
WWR 97;R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193;R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, [1990]
5 WWR 1) and the level of fault required for particular criminal offences (e.g. R v Vaillancourt, [1987]
2 SCR 636, 47 DLR (4th) 399; R vMartineau, [1990] 2 SCR 633, [1990] 6 WWR 97).
86. R v Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 SCR 571 at para 136.
87. Ibid at para 174.
88. Ibid at paras 176-178.
89. Ibid at paras 179-182.
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91. Ibid at para 133.
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may rely on disapproval to ground policies that are causing harm without
commensurate benefit.
Applying this standard in Canada (AG) v Bedford,92 the Court
similarly reflected harm reduction's pragmatic focus on minimizing
discernible harm when it struck down criminal prohibitions on activities
surrounding prostitution for the risks they created to the lives and safety
of sex workers.93 Here, the Court found that the Criminal Code provisions
on keeping a brothel, on communicating for the purposes of prostitution,
and on living on the avails of prostitution were overbroad and grossly
disproportionate to their purposes oftargeting exploitation through pimping
and preventing nuisance associated with brothels and the street-based sale
of sex because of the dangers they presented to the lives and safety of sex
workers. Again, there was close scrutiny of the extent to which criminal
prohibitions served their purpose and of unintended negative health and
social repercussions. Of course, to the extent that the purposes of new
legislation might be understood differently, the proportionality analysis in
section 7 might not yield the same result.94
Through these cases, the Supreme Court of Canada thus crystallized9 5 a
constitutional requirement that state conduct in criminal law must actually
serve its intended purposes, and that the extent to which it does so must
be weighed against any harm created by the law itself In other words, the
government is "constitutionally barred from ignoring evidence in making
policy, at least where life, liberty and security of the person are at stake."96
In considering relative harm in this way, cases like PHS and Bedford
incorporate into Charter analysis harm reduction's emphasis on empirical
92. 2013 SCC 72 at paras 123, 159, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].
93. Emily van der Meulen, Elya M Durisin & Victoria Love, Selling Sex: Experience, Advocacy,
Research on Sex Work in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 202, claiming that the
criminalization of sex work and drugs deny full citizenship.
94. After the Supreme Court struck down the provisions as unconstitutional, the legislature passed
a new law substantially reproducing many of the provisions declared unconstitutional, but specifying
new purposes in its preamble, including responding to "concerns about the exploitation that is inherent
in prostitution" and "protect[ing] human dignity and equality of all Canadians by discouraging
prostitution" and Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Bedford and to make consequential amendments to
otherActs, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014.
95. The doctrines of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality have roots in early cases
likeR vMorgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385, but have come into focus inthe more recent
decisions of Chaoulli v Quebec (AG), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 79, PHS and Bedford. On that
subject, see Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 140. See also Hogg, supra note 73; R v Carter, 2015 SCC 5
at para 46.
96. Vanessa MacDonnell, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2011-2012 Term" (2012) 59
SCLR (2d) 51 at 85.
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evidence of state interventions' effects (what works) over the traditional
conception of the criminal law's role of setting a moral compass.97
Beyond the doctrinal point, cases decided under the new conception
of section 7 may also have the effect of re-aligning political discussion
around shorter term, measurable, and more immediate consequences of
criminal prohibitions as opposed to long-term goals such as the complete
elimination of markets in illegal drugs or the eradication of prostitution.
In this vein, the pragmatic aspect of the harm reduction approach can
arguably be observed in Quebec's new law on assisted suicide.98 Despite
the criminal prohibition on assisted suicide that remained in force at the
time the law was adopted,99 Quebec's law regulates assisted suicide with a
public health-oriented approach that focuses on mitigating and balancing
the risk of the vulnerable being induced to end their lives against their
will against the autonomy of the person who may be unable to end his or
her life as desired without assistance. I"' This law was motivated in part
by a recognition that the practice of assisted dying continues without any
institutional safeguards even where it is prohibited,"0 ' and that these harms
cannot be mitigated by an absolute prohibition.
In terms of constructing the identity of the subject, however, the
congruence with the principles and philosophy of harm reduction and its
legal turn are less clear. For marginalized groups and individuals whose
interests are ignored by majoritarian politics,0 2 these developments
may provide a "powerful tool," particularly in a "climate in which the
government appears determined to make political choices regardless of
their logic."10 3 This new direction takes risks to the health and safety of
drug users (or sex workers, or those facing end-of-life decision-making)
seriously, recognizing them as citizens whose well-being deserves
protection through pragmatic and empirically-supported means. In this
regard, these developments would seem to reflect the subject as a worthy
citizen. This potential to construct and recognize the identity of the drug
user or sex worker differently, however, may be limited, particularly
97. See Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] SCR 1 at 50, [1949]
1 DLR 433, setting out the purposes of the criminal law as including "public peace, order, security,
health, morality".
98. Bill 52, supra note 16.
99. Note that after the Quebec law was passed, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the
criminal prohibition for being overbroad in relation to its object of "protecting vulnerable people from
being induced to commit suicide at a moment of weakness" inR v Carter, supra note 95 at para 86.
100. See Udo Schuklenk et al, "End-of-life Decision-Making in Canada: the Report by the Royal
Society of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision Making" (2011) 25:sl Bioethics 1.
101. Ibidat 48.
102. See Hogg, supra note 73 at 209.
103. See MacDonnell, supra note 96 at 85.
464 The Dalhousie Law Journal
when compared with harm reduction's ambitions as a social movement.
Exploring this question, the next section will trace the key features of
harm reduction as it is reflected within social movements, in public health
interventions, and within legal doctrine.
III. Identity and harm reduction 's key features in context
Critical public health scholars have observed how pragmatism and scientism
in state public health iterations of harm reduction have systematically
obscured other features and values of harm reduction, undermining
its potential to reconstruct and de-marginalize the subject. This section
tracks the features of harm reduction as they appear in grassroots, public
health, and legal contexts and argues that from each setting to the next,
the standards and methods for demonstrating interventions' effectiveness
become more exacting and exclusionary, mitigating harm reduction's
counter-hegemonic promise.
1. From grassroots movement to public health institution
Harm reduction proponents generally claim to treat drug use itself as a
morally neutral behaviour. That is, the methods of harm reduction are said
to make no moralistic judgment either to condemn or to support use of any
drug by any method." 4 As one early harm reduction scholar evocatively
put it, "[b]oth the hedonist and the puritan can apply harm reduction.""1 5
This claim to value neutrality looks different at the level of public
health institutions than it does at the grassroots. One ethnography
demonstrates how the Santa Cruz Needle exchange program, an initially
illegal program started by drug users and AIDS activists, rejects the
notion that abstinence should in any way be part of the harm reduction
discussion, unless a program participant explicitly raises the issue."0 6 In
fact, the program explicitly celebrates drug use in various ways in order
to resist the stigma of drug use as immoral, pathological, and illegal.0 7
As one participant was quoted to have said in Junkphood, the program's
'zine, "[w]e should fight the feeling that there is something wrong with us
because we like to get high."0 8 Similarly, VANDU's Manifesto for a Drug
User Liberation Movement describes its movement as advocating "the
right to obtain, prepare, and ingest drugs, according to our own personal
decisions without criminalization or unsought interference from other
104. Riley et al, "Concepts and practice," supra note 55 at 12.
105. John Strang, "Drug Use and Harm Reduction: Responding to the Challenge" in Heather et al,
supra note 22, 3 at 15.
106. Wieloch, supra note 10 at 50.
107. Ibid at 52.
108. Ibid at 59.
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individuals or organizations, as long as our drug use does not directly harm
other people."10 9 Grassroots movements tend to view dangers associated
with drug use as by-products of colonization and of socioeconomic,
racial, gender, and political inequalities.1 0 The grassroots harm reduction
movement is in this way aggressively value neutral as to drug use. It urges
that there is nothing wrong with using drugs or with people who use drugs.
In contrast, the value neutrality vis-A-vis drug use reflected in the
professionalized public health context shifts subtly to something more
like, "We promise not to judge you for doing drugs,111 a stance which may
ultimately reinforce the perception of the harms of drug use as inherent
rather than societally produced. Harm reduction in public health has been
said to occupy a middle ground between prohibition and legalization.1
For tactical reasons1 3 and because of its disciplinary relationship to
evidence-based medicine, 14 professional public health places greater
emphasis on the pragmatic, outcome-oriented aspects of harm reduction
over any profound ideological commitment to value neutrality vis-A-vis
drug use itself Value neutrality-meeting the 'client' where he or she is,
without judgment-is presented as an instrumental practice, subservient to
pragmatic objectives, rather than a reflection of commitment to humanistic
values such as individual agency. Further, perhaps out of fear of being
perceived as supporting illegal drug use, public health harm reduction has
extended its pragmatic focus beyond reducing mortality and morbidity of
drug users to include, even if only as a secondary purpose, the reduction
of public order or nuisance problems. 5 In doing so, it has been argued, it
tacitly accepts temperance as a harm reduction goal to the extent that this
may reduce harm to the public."6
109. Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users, ANDU Manifesto for a Drug User Liberation
Movement (Vancouver: VANDU, 2010), online: <www.vandu.org/documentsI/ANDU-manifesto-
july-20] 0.doc> [VANDU Manifesto].
110. Roe, supra note 32 at 245; Boyd & Boyd, supra note 50.
111. See e.g. Clive L Morrison & Sue M Ruben, "The Development of Healthcare Services for Drug
Misusers and Prostitutes" (1995) 71:840 Postgraduate Medical J 593 at 594 (describing the harm-
reduction philosophy of two state-based harm reduction services as follows: "Drug misusers are
encouraged to progress through a hierarchy of goals to limit the health consequences of their action..
Abstinence is the ultimate aim but a non-judgemental approach can encourage interim steps toward
this end, through activities that involve less risk or harm.").
112. Erickson, "What It Is and Is Not," supra note 5 at 284.
113. Andrew D Hathaway & Patricia G Erickson, "Drug Reform Principles and Policy Debates:
Harm Reduction Prospects for Cannabis in Canada" (2003) 33:2 J Drug Issues 465 at 484.
114. Tammi, supra note 20 at 387.
115. Benedikt Fischer et al, "Drug Use, Risk, and Urban Order: Examining Supervised Injection Sites
(SISs) as 'Governmentality"' (2004) 15:5-6 Intl J Drug Policy 357 at 360.
116. Andrew D Hathaway, "Shortcomings of Harm Reduction: Toward a Morally Invested Drug
Reform Strategy" (2001) 12:2 Intl J Drug Policy 125 at 126, 127.
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In a context where politics are aligned against the drug user by
legal prohibition, social marginalization, and a general discourse that
is unfavourable to (hard) drug users, the heavy focus on behaviour
modification and the narrow pragmatics of risk reduction may reinforce
the notion that drug use is inherently and necessarily dangerous.11 Indeed,
as Foucauldian critics argue, by operating alongside prohibition, harm
reduction risks becoming an apologist for dominant discourses around
punitive drug laws. According to Roe, the problem is the selective
deployment of harm reduction. To win the support of mainstream political
bodies, institutionalized harm reduction willingly restricts itself to the
mere mitigation of the harms caused by prohibition and abstinence based
treatments. 118
Further, the depoliticized, institutional version of harm reduction
lacks the grassroots movement's potential to reconstruct the subject as a
citizen with full participation rights, as opposed to a deviant person or
helpless victim.119 These latter constructions of the drug user have been
and continue to be relied upon in traditional medical and criminal models
of addiction to legitimize coercion 120 and to exclude users from normative
categories of citizenship, such as "the general public. 121 One of harm
reduction's promises is to reconceive otherwise marginalized populations
as "active citizens capable, as individuals and communities, of managing
their own risk. 2  However, state and political resistance may set in
around harm reduction programs that are not yet supported by sufficient
scientific study, even when widely supported by experiential knowledge of
front line workers and drug users themselves. The failure of public health
actors to facilitate the introduction of safer crack smoking kits is a good
example. Grassroots organizations in several Canadian cities had noted
a risk of disease transmission as a result of sharing crack pipes and other
makeshift smoking equipment and began distributing kits including pyrex
stems, lip balm, alcohol wipes, and other items. The kits were supported
by some public health authorities, but resisted by others who claimed the
intervention lacked a sufficient evidence base. 123 Subsequent scientific
117. Ibid at 126.
118. Roe, supra note 32 at 247.
119. See Tammi, supra note 20 at 385; Wieloch, supra note 10.
120. Marlatt, "Come as You Are," supra note 24 at 786.
121. Helen Keane, "Critiques of Harm Reduction, Morality and the Promise of Human Rights"
(2003) 14:3 Intl J Drug Policy 227 at 229.
122. Mitchell Dean, Governmentaliy: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2nd ed (London: Sage,
2010) at 197.
123. Emma Haydon & Benedikt Fischer, "Crack Use as a Public Health Problem in Canada: Call for
an Evaluation of 'Safer Crack Use Kits"' (2005) 96:3 Can J Pub Health 185 at 185-188.
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research has supported the introduction of such interventions, and yet they
have not been widely introduced. 12 4 Claims that public health iterations of
harm reduction are truly user-centred lose persuasiveness in this context.125
Instead, critical public health scholars argue that in the hands of the
state, harm reduction can become a form of "surveillance medicine",
increasing state control of drug users, objectifying their bodies and
creating a moralistic duty on citizens to be healthy, without challenging
the dominant social, economic, medical, and legal conditions and
discourses that drive criminalization and health risks in the first place. 26
It reflects a neoliberal notion of individual responsibilization disguised as
a progressive practice. 27 Equal moral citizenship becomes illusory as the
users are divided into the responsible and the irresponsible. The claim that
harm reduction represents a turn away from punitive and non-authoitarian
approaches to drug use is diminished, as authority is merely shifted
from the criminological to the biomedical. 28 That is, good citizenship is
constructed as adherence to the expectations of public health authorities.
Meanwhile, the threat of criminal sanction still looms.
Grassroots, peer-to-peer organizations provide services that may be
similar to state public health institutions, but they do so within a broader
agenda of promoting users' rights as citizens. 29 Beyond mutual help and
self-help, peer-based grassroots groups amount to a political identity-
based social movement.13 Tammi describes this "identity work" as both
"reflexive and empowering": users become conscious of their ability
to shape their social selves and to participate in political action as they
engage with the drivers of their marginalization beyond the means and
conditions in which they use drugs. 31
One response to the concerns expressed above has been to ensure that
harm reduction in all its iterations includes a commitment to use human
124. Andrew Ivsins et al, "Uptake, Benefits of and Barriers to Safer Crack Use Kit (SCUK)
Distribution Programmes in Victoria, Canada-A Qualitative Exploratiof' (2011) 22:4 Intl J Drug
Policy 292.
125. See also PM Spittal et al, "How Otherwise Dedicated AIDS Prevention Workers Come to
Support State-Sponsored Shortage of Clean Syringes in Vancouver, Canada" (2004) 15:1 Intl J Drug
Policy 36.
126. Peter Miller, "A Critical Review of the Harm Minimization Ideology in Australia" (2001) 11:2
Critical Public Health 167; Fischer et al, supra note 115; Nadine Ezard, "Public Health, Human
Rights, and the Harm Reduction Paradigm: From Risk Reduction to Vulnerability Reduction" (2001)
12:3 Intl J Drug Policy 207.
127. Smith, supra note 32 at 214.
128. Ibid at 213; Keane, supra note 121; Roe, supra note 32.
129. Tammi, supra note 20 at 389; VANDUManifesto, supra note 109.
130. Wieloch, supra note 10.
131. Tammi, supra note 20 at 390.
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rights frameworks in order to understand what drives vulnerability to drug-
related harm in the first place."' Others seek a more radical re-politicized
future for public health iterations of harm reduction where, for example,
addiction professionals recognize the role of capitalism in producing both
addiction and its consequences in their research and their practice.133
2. Identity construction and harm reduction in law
As discussed, the legal integration of harm reduction approaches has
the potential to construct the subject as worthy of health protection as it
elevates immediate health needs of subjects over longer term and arguably
unachievable goals like the elimination of drug markets and prostitution
altogether. It may also have the effect of putting tools in the hands of the
marginalized to respond to governments that make harmful and illogical
political choices. However, many of the identity-construction critiques
of institutionalized harm reduction canvassed in the previous subsection
apply with equal or greater force to harm reduction as a legal device.
First, to the extent that the underlying behaviour remains criminal,
the subject is still constructed as deviant or helpless. In PHS, for example,
the Court refused to find that the possession law itself endangered the
health of drug users, grounding its decision instead on the minister of
health's failure to exercise his discretion to grant an exemption to Insite, as
contemplated in section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.134
This reinforces the notion that there are "good" drug users, who consume
in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed by state institutions,
and "bad" drug users who remain the proper subject of criminal sanction.135
Moreover, the "good" drug users who use Insite do so because they have
no choice: the Court relied heavily on an addiction justification in response
to the government's argument that a person's choice to use drugs, not the
law, was the cause of death and disease that Insite prevents. 13 6 The broader
role of the criminal law in perpetuating risks of harm is thus ignored, as is
the legitimacy of criminalization in the first place. In Bedford, by contrast,
where the Court was able to rely on the fact that prostitution itself was not
illegal,13 the activity of sex work was constructed far more neutrally. It
was acknowledged as a potentially risky activity, but the state was found
132. See Ezard, supra note 126; Elliott et al, supra note 58.
133. Smith, supra note 32 at 217. See similarly Roe, supra note 32.
134. PHS, supra note 69 at para 109.
135. Fischer et al, supra note 115.
136. PHS, supra note 69 at para 99-101.
137. Bedford, supra note 92 at para 5.
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to be imposing dangerous conditions on it, depriving people of the ability
to protect themselves.138
Second, the Court in PHS constructs its good user with primary
reference to scientific, medicalized standards, leaving even less space
for community-level knowledge to be translated into policy than public
health harm reduction does. In holding that the minister of health was
constitutionally required to grant an exemption from the drug laws to Insite,
the Court cited an extensive body of publicly supported research specific to
Insite itself, demonstrating its established track record of providing health
benefits to its clients and its lack ofneighbourhood disruption. 139 Of course,
this track record could only be established because Insite had operated
legally with a federal exemption for years before the minister of health
declined to issue a new one. Some authors have expressed doubt that only
local evidence of effectiveness could meet the standard for new section
56 exemptions for harm reduction facilities. Instead, they argue, generic
evidence of a particular harm reduction intervention's effectiveness-
including evidence from other jurisdictions or animal models-should
suffice to gain an exemption from the operation of the enforcement of
drug laws.14' Either way, the judicial iteration of harm reduction doubles
down on the notion that only interventions that meet scientific thresholds
of reliability may be deemed licit, maintaining the criminal backdrop to
"surveillance medicine. 141
Third, harm reduction within legal doctrine may be even more
vulnerable to colonization by community expectations than public health
harm reduction. In PHS, for example, the minister's refusal to grant
Insite an exemption was assessed in relation to the legislator's objectives
of protecting public health and safety.14 ' As such, the claimants' right
to obtain access to safe injection depended not only on Insite's proven
capacity to prevent overdoses and serve the health needs of people using
drugs, but also to do so without disrupting the community. The Court cited
with favour the report of a local business association report that Insite
had reduced crime in the area.14 1 In Bedford, similarly, the impugned
138. Bedford, supra note 92 at para 60, 89.
139. PHS, supra note 69 atpara 131, 152.
140. Elaine Hyshka, Tania Bubela & T Cameron Wild, "Prospects for Scaling-Up Supervised
Injection Facilities in Canada: The Role of Evidence in Legal and Political Decision-Making" (2013)
108:3 Addiction 468 at 471.
141. Consider, for example, a court's refusal to consider an Aboriginal offender's argument that
he dealt marijuana to his community members to help them abstain from more destructive alcohol
consumption as a mitigating factor at sentencing: R v Smith, 2011 YKTC 62, 98 WCB (2d) 251.
142. PHS, supra note 68 at para 136.
143. Ibid.
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legislation's effects were found perverse because they failed to correspond
with the legislator's own goals.144 The Conservative government has
responded with new legislation in both cases. Bill C-2, the Respect for
Communities Act, amended the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to
require that any new safe injection site obtain a letter from, among others,
local government and police outlining their "opinion on the proposed
activities at the site, including any concerns with respect to public safety
and security." '145 In addition to increasing the administrative hurdles any
proposed new safe injection sites would face, it represents a legislative
expression of the importance of community views in shaping harm
reduction policy. In relation to prostitution, the Protection of Communities
and Exploited Persons Act largely reproduces and adds to the criminal
prohibitions struck down in Bedford, this time recharacterizing the purpose
of legislation related to prostitution as recognizing the inherent wrongs of
sex work itself 146
Finally, in its construction of the subject as a citizen with full
participation rights, the legal iteration of harm reduction falls short. As
suggested earlier, harm reduction in legal doctrine takes seriously the
health risks faced by sex workers and people who use drugs and recognizes
the state role in constructing risk through criminal law. However, it
does so with great limitations. First, both PHS147and Bedford148 rely on
a negative rights interpretation of section 7 of the Charter, essentially
precluding government from enacting laws that interfere with health-
seeking behaviours in a way that is perverse to the purposes of those
laws. Courts in Canada have been unwilling to recognize that section 7
might impose positive obligations on government in relation to such basic
needs as health care, housing, income and the like.149 As such, the turn
to harm reduction in law fails to acknowledge the many forms of state
action and neglect that drive vulnerability to the negative consequences
of drug use.15 Citizenship here is understood narrowly as freedom from
government interference backed by rights-based recourses in courts.
This is a thin rights paradigm compared with that of the human rights
144. Bedford, supra note 92 at paras 134, 142, 159.
145. Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 2nd Sess, 4 lth Part, 2014,
cl 5 (as passed by the House of Commons 23 March 2015), ss 56.1(3)(c), 56.1(3)(e).
146. SC 2014, c 25, preamble.
147. PHS, supra note 69 at para 93 (describing the state action as "preventing access" to existing state
services).
148. Bedford, supra note 92 at para 88.
149. See e.g. Gosselin v Quebec (AG), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429; Tanudjaja v Canada (AG),
2013 ONSC 1878, 227 ACWS (3d) 364.
150. See Ezard, supra note 126.
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movement, informed by the full range of substantive and participatory
rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural, which harm
reduction's proponents are increasingly urging. 151
Conclusion
This paper is not intended to deny that harm reduction can inform
meaningful, effective responses to hegemonic criminal law, particularly
in a climate where criminal policies are enacted in a way that lacks an
evidence base. On the contrary, harm reduction's numerous features-its
humanistic focus, its orientation toward self-determination ofmarginalized
individuals and groups, its recognition of the perverse consequences of
dominant drug paradigms-make it suited to this task. Rather, this paper
seeks to draw attention to the gap between promise and practice that results
when harm reduction is embedded within particular institutional contexts.
Harm reduction proponents should welcome the law's integration of
aspects of the philosophy. However, lessons from the adoption of harm
reduction by public health institutions recommend reflexivity about how
institutionally-embedded conceptions of harm reduction may construct
subjects as undeserving and may obscure the ways in which state social,
economic and criminal policy creates and perpetuates risk.
151. Ibid; Elliott et al, supra note 58; Keane, supra note 121.

